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The facts of the Francovich1 case are by now well known. The Italian 
Government failed to transpose into national law the terms of Directive 
80/987/EEC which required Member States to set up a compensation scheme 
whereby arrears of salary would be paid to employees by guarantee institutions 
in the event of their employer’s insolvency. Further, it had failed to act upon 
a judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice under Article 169 EEC 
finding it in breach of its obligations in this respect.2
The applicants, left without compensation when their employers become 
insolvent, had been unable to bring an action in their national courts requiring 
the interpretation of national law in accordance with Community law,3 there 
being quite simply no national legislation in the field of the directive which 
could be interpreted. Moreover, it emerged in the Court’s judgment that they 
could not rely directly on the provisions of the directive because those 
provisions were insufficiently clear in respect of the institution which was to be 
responsible for paying compensation.4 The applicants were therefore, under 
the current state of Community law, without remedy.
The Court held that the remedy of the applicants lay in a claim for 
compensation against the Italian government for failure to carry out its 
obligations under Community law. The Court stated that:



























































































State is obliged to make good the damage to individuals caused by a 
breach of Community law for which it is responsible.’5
This obligation arises out of Article 5 EEC which places a general duty on 
Member States to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of their 
obligations under Community law.6
Having made its general statement of principle, the Court laid down more 
specific criteria for liability in damages in respect of the individual case of non­
implementation of a directive. Liability would arise where the directive 
conferred rights on individuals, where the content of those rights was 
identifiable from the provisions of the directive, and where there was a causal 
link between the failure of the Member State to fulfil its obligations and the 
damage suffered by the individual.7
Questions remain with respect to the operation of the remedy in the specific case 
of non-implementation of a directive. The criteria laid down by the Court were 
stated to be merely sufficient, and not necessary, to give rise to liability in 
damages,8 whilst it is unclear, for example, whether a prior decision under 169 
is required, and how proximate and discrete the ’causal link’ must be. More 
general questions arise as to how other breaches of Community law by Member 
States are to be dealt with. The wording of the general principle of liability in 
damages suggests that compensation would be available for other types of 
breach, and the Court stated in fact that the availability of damages would 
depend on the nature of the breach of Community law,9 but it made no attempt 
to detail the criteria for liability applicable to other types of breach. In 
particular, it is unclear whether there will be any role for a criterion of fault in 




























































































liability in a particular instance by demonstrating that it had acted reasonably.
This paper shall attempt to achieve two objectives. First, to briefly place the 
Francovich case in its legal and institutional context and to demonstrate that 
whilst it may be a decision of enormous constitutional significance for the 
Community, it was by means unexpected and could even be described as 
inevitable. Second, to predict or suggest the ways in which the remedy may 
develop in the future, by examining whether a general basis for comparison can 
be found amongst pre-existing regimes for public authority liability in damages, 
and by assessing in greater detail the specific criteria which may determine the 
liability in damages of a Member State for breach of Community law.
The Damages Remedy in Context
The argument that a Member State should be financially liable for damage 
caused to individuals by its breach of Community law is by no means a new 
one. The Court itself submitted proposals to this effect as long ago as 1975.'" 
The eventual creation, by the Court in Francovich. of a remedy in damages can 
be seen, however, as a natural consequence of certain institutional and judicial 
developments in the 1980s.
A. Institutional Developments
Of the institutional developments, the most significant was arguably the setting 




























































































directive, which lays down a legislative framework to be transposed into 
national law by the Member States, was to be the main instrument of reform.12
The task of ensuring that Member States effected a complete and faithful 
transposition of directives became, then, of paramount importance.13
It is the Commission which, under the Treaty, has the pre-eminent role in 
supervising compliance, by Member States, with Community law. 
Nevertheless, in pursuit of this end, the Commission is empowered with only the 
cumbersome, lengthy and, in many cases, including Francovich. ultimately 
ineffective 169 EEC action.14
The Court of Justice, however, has developed a system of judicial remedies in 
respect of the non-implementation of directives and thereby assisted the 
Commission in its enforcement responsibilities. A significant part of the 
Commission’s burden of supervision has been passed onto individual enforcers, 
bypassing the shortcomings of the Article 169 procedure and freeing valuable 
resources for other tasks. The Francovich remedy is an essential component of 
this liability system.
The conferral of a new kind of right on individuals, the right to sue Member 
States in damages for breach of Community law, may also be seen as consistent 
with the institutional trend towards decentralisation, currently expressed in the 
principle of subsidiarity.15 A subsidiarity-based approach to the allocation of 
legislative power, in moving power further away from the Commission, moves 
it further from the body which is supposed to supervise the exercise of that 
power in the Community sphere. When powers are devolved to national and 
regional governments, the Commission’s only recourse is the Article 169 action.




























































































allowed individuals to act in a supervisory capacity in certain circumstances,1" 
and hence to compensate for the shortcomings of the 169 procedure.
In many cases, however, the directives and other legal instruments used in a 
Community guided by subsidiarity may well be too vague and allow too much 
discretion to the Member States to be susceptible to direct effect.17 Other 
remedies must therefore be made available to individuals and on this view the 
damages action for breach of Community law can be seen as an essential 
element of the remedies system in a subsidiarity-based Community. As powers 
are moved closer to the citizens of the Community, so must the remedies for 
breach of those powers move also.18
It is important to note in this context that Francovich has a direct institutional 
parallel. New provisions in the Treaty on European Union amending Article 
171 EEC allow the Court of Justice to impose lump sum and penalty payments 
on Member States who fail to comply with Court judgments finding them in 
breach of their Community obligations.19
B. Judicial Developments
The Treaty of Rome, whilst implicitly requiring that Community law be 
effective, seemed on its fact to have accepted a loose, public international law­
like system of compliance. The only remedies provided for in the pursuit of 
compliance were the 169 action, and its sister provision, 170 EEC whereby one 
Member State would take action against another in the European Court of 
Justice.2" The Court of Justice has, however, intervened to remedy this 




























































































Community law can be identified, notably the development of the fundamental 
concepts of supremacy and direct effect of Commuity law.21
In Marshall.22 however, in holding that the direct effect of directives could not 
be relied upon horizontally, by one individual as against another, the Court can 
be seen to have reached its limits of its activism. In terms of its reasoning, the 
estoppel-type argument which had been adopted to justify the conferral of direct 
effect on directives, that Member States could not be allowed to plead and so 
to benefit from, as against individuals, their own failure to perform the 
obligations entailed by a directive,23 could not be cited against another 
individual who had no obligation to implement a directive. More general, 
conceptual difficulties arose out of the distinction drawn in 189 EEC between 
directives and regulations, a distinction which, had arguably been flouted even 
by the conferral on certain directives of ’vertical' direct effect, that is, as against 
the state. In political terms, certain national courts, notably those of France and 
Germany,24 had objected to direct effect for directives under any circumstances 
and would clearly have had great difficulties in accepting the principle of 
horizontal direct effect.2'’
The basic problem posed by the decision in Marshall is that it creates arbitrary 
distinctions between individuals. On the facts of that case, the distinction fell 
between private and public sector employees, the latter but not the former being 
able to enforce their rights under Community law. The UK Government argued 
to this effect in Marshall eliciting the response that:
’Such a distinction may easily be avoided if the Member State concerned




























































































Whilst the Court’s response to this argument was clearly influenced by the fact 
that it was made by a Member State seeking to avoid liability for its 
wrongdoing, it is important to note that its response to the doctrinal problems 
caused by direct effect of directives was to encourage proper implementation 
from the start.27 Direct effect, whilst promoting effectiveness in the individual 
case, does not in itself give much encouragement to proper implementation of 
directives, particularly where, as in Marshall the national remedies against the 
state are relatively insignificant.2X
A natural consequence of the Court’s approach in Marshall is therefore that 
individuals themselves must be given some meaningful remedy to compel 
implementation. A right to financial compensation where damage is incurred 
as a result of non-implementation is such a meaningful remedy. Francovich. 
then, in tackling at its source the problem of absent or faulty implementation 
does indeed bypass the doctrinal problems posed by Marshall.2'1
This argument would suggest, however, that the Francovich decision came 
twenty years too late. If, instead of conferring limited direct effect on 
directives in Van Duvn.30 the Court had instead provided the applicant with a 
remedy in damages against the defaulting Member State, it might have achieved 
similar, if not better results in terms of implementation and general effectiveness 
of Community law, without the controversy and arbitrary drawing of distinctions 
which has arisen out of direct effect for directives.




























































































It is expressly stated in Francovich that it is for national systems to designate 
the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions (as to 
’substance and form’)31 for the recovery of damages. This autonomy is 
however conditional. Firstly, it is contingent upon ’the absence of Community 
rules on this subject’.32 As the Court of Justice lays down more detailed rules 
in future cases, so national rules will be modified or displaced. Secondly, it is 
subject to the usual conditions relating to national remedies in matters of 
Community law, that is, the remedies must be no less beneficial than remedies 
for breach of national law, and must not be excessively difficult to obtain.36 
Thirdly, the national courts’ control over the details of the Francovich remedy 
will clearly, given the vagueness and generality of the decision, be exercised 
under the guidance of the Court of Justice through the Article 177 preliminary 
reference procedure. Whilst national courts may decide certain questions of 
Community law themselves, without seeking the assistance of the Court of 
Justice, the circumstances in which this is acceptable are strictly 
circumscribed,34 and it is arguable that questions relating to Francovich cannot 
be considered ’easy’ enough to be a suitable area for independent national court 
action.35
Most importantly, perhaps, the autonomy of national courts in the matter of 
national remedies has, in the recent past, frequently proved to be more apparent 
than real. The division of competence issue arose in the Zuckerfabrik case with 
respect to interim protection where the validity of national administrative 
measures based on Community legislation was in question.36 The Court 
reasoned that whilst national courts have jurisdiction over national remedies, in 
practice this autonomy might prejudice the uniform application of Community 
law, given that national laws differed as to the conditions on which the 




























































































had to lay down a framework of uniform rules. Moreover, even in respect of 
clearly procedural matters such as national time limits, the Court of Justice has 
felt the need to intervene, to curb the autonomy of national courts.37
In summary, the elaboration of the criteria for liability in damages for breach of 
Community law is likely to be a joint enterprise between national courts and the 
Court of Justice. The Court will lay down more general principles to be 
applied to particular cases by national courts which will at the same time 
develop procedural details, such as limitation periods.
Bases for Comparison
The Francovich action may be novel in the Community context but each and 
every legal system has its own rules on public authority liability, and it is 
instructive to determine whether Francovich liability has a useful analogue 
amongst pre-existing regimes.
The discourse of Francovich is concerned essentially with the situation where 
a lower level of government has not implemented, or has contravened, legal 
provisions issued by a higher level of government. The most obvious 
comparator would therefore be with federal legal systems, such as the United 
States and Germany, and specifically with actions whereby the citizen seeks to 
enforce state government compliance with federal legal provisions.
The immediate problem which arises with this project is the unique nature of the 




























































































federal systems that the higher tier of government merely lays out a legal 
structure within which the units of government of the lower tier are free to 
choose the form and methods of regulation. Federal law is generally directly 
and immediately applicable in its entirety in state jurisdictions, and it is only the 
distinctive heterogeneous and diverse nature of the Community project which 
requires an interposing discretion between higher and lower tiers. Directives 
have features which are arguably closer to international treaties than to federal 
legislation.3><
The comparison with public authority liability in damages in common law 
systems such as England is similarly problematic.39
Firstly, it is difficult to conceptualise the Francovich action in terms of duties 
of care on the part of public authorities towards particular individuals or classes 
of individuals, as is required under English law. Rather than arguing on the 
basis of the state’s duty towards himself, the individual would appear to be 
enforcing the state’s duty to the Community to implement directives, under 189 
EEC, or more generally, to give effect to Community obligations, under 5 EEC.
More specifically, the Francovich remedy suggests the presence of a duty to the 
individual, and hence, in English law terms, of public authority liability in 
circumstances where such a duty would not normally arise under English law.
In England, public authority liability, at least in negligence, is, in general, 
governed by a distinction known as the policy-operational dichotomy.4" The 
lower the level of government at which the decision in question is taken, the 
more likely it is that a duty of care on the part of the authority will be implied.
At the higher level of policy decisions, the duty of the public authority to the 




























































































will generally not arise. Francovich however is premised on a concept of 
liability to individuals for normative acts, or policy decisions, (such as the non­
transposition of directives), which has no parallel in English law.41 It has 
been noted that problems may arise if English courts attempt to assimilate 
Francovich principles into the existing English system of remedies rather than 
concentrating upon their communautaire source.42
A more useful comparison, favoured by Advocate General Mischo in 
Francovich. may arguably be made with the system of liability of Community 
institutions under Article 215 EEC.
Francovich and Article 215
The criteria for the award of damages against Community institutions under 
Article 215 EEC are notoriously narrow. A finding that the institution has 
acted illegally is not sufficient. The so-called Schôppenstedt formula states 
that:
’Where legislative action involving choices of economic policy is 
concerned, the Community does not incur non-contractual liability for 
damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of that action, by virtue 
of the provisions contained in Article 215 unless a sufficiently flagrant 
violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has 
occurred.43




























































































disregard of duties by the institution concerned,44 or alternatively by conduct 
verging on the arbitrary.45 Recent cases have further indicated a type of 
standing requirement whereby applicants must have suffered serious loss and be 
part of a small and preferably closed group.46
The comparative development of the Francovich action along the lines of the 
narrow criteria relating to Article 215 infringements, favoured by Advocate 
General Mischo in Francovich itself, would be suggested by three factors. 
Firstly, it may be said in general that, like Francovich but unlike many existing 
national liability models, the Article 215 action presupposes the possibility of 
liability in damages of public authorities for normative acts. Secondly, the 
strictly circumscribed liability of Community institutions, has, according to the 
wording of 215 EEC, been arrived at having regard to the principles of public 
authority liability pertaining in the legal systems of Member States.47
Thirdly, certain national courts have been reluctant in the past to contemplate 
imposing liability on national authorities on the basis of criteria less favourable 
to the defendant than those which apply to the Community institutions under 
Article 215.4*
This attitude has reflected a fear that Member States will not be allowed the 
same leeway with respect to discretionary policy choices, and particularly 
choices of economic policy, which Community institutions retain. In England, 
the question of liability in damages for breach of Community law has in the past 
been seen in the light of the complex doctrine surrounding the tort of breach of 
statutory duty, mainly because Community law is given force of law in the 
United Kingdom by the European Communities Act 1972. The problem in 




























































































law could arise independently of the criteria for the tort of breach of statutory 
duty which are designed to limit the liability of public authorities.4g
More specific concerns have focussed on the situation whereby a Member State 
may be liable for implementing a Community directive which subsequently 
turned out to be illegal, where the Community institution which issued it is not, 
because of the strict criteria which apply to Article 215 actions.1" It may be 
stated immediately, however, that given the absolute obligation to transpose 
directives into national law incumbent on Member States under Article 189 
EEC, there are strong arguments to suggest that in such a situation, only the 
Community and not the Member State would be liable.51 This point is further 
discussed below.
However, there are good reasons for suggesting that Article 215 is not in fact 
a comparator suitable for use by either the Court of Justice, or by national 
courts, in the development of the Francovich action.
The ECJ has itself warned against applying Article 215 rules to national 
litigation. In the BALM case, the Court of Justice rejected the argument that 
the rules relating to limitation periods under Article 215, should be adopted for 
the purposes of a national law remedy. It stated that national authorities must 
instead:
’..assess [the] ... situation on the basis of the rules and principles of their 
own national laws provided that they do not make a distinction between 
situations governed by Community law and similar situations subject to 




























































































An English court which applied the criteria applicable to 215 actions to a 
Francovich claim would arguably be in contravention of its duty under 5 EEC 
to ensure that remedies for breach of Community law are as favourable as 
equivalent national law remedies. In so doing it may also breach the second 
limb of its duty, to ensure that the remedy is not excessively difficult to obtain 
in practice.53
Further, the Court’s attitude towards the development of the 215 action against 
Community institutions can be said to be based on policy considerations which 
differ in significant ways from those which gave rise to the Community remedy 
in damages for breach of Community law.54
It has been suggested above that the Francovich decision is founded on a desire 
to promote the effectiveness of Community law, and in particular, to encourage 
Member States to properly implement Community directives. These policies 
would suggest a more liberal approach to the award of damages. The 
application of restrictive Article 215 criteria would render the threat of damages, 
if not illusory, at least remote, and would not be in complete accordance with 
the principle of effectiveness.
The Court of Justice has indicated in relation to 215 actions, that it is keen to 
guard against indeterminate liability, to avoid placing the Community in the 
position of being a ’deep-pocket insurer’ for the everyday risks of its subjects.
This basic concern with respect to public authority liability is shared by 
national courts throughout the Community, indeed throughout the world.55 
However, it is arguable that certain features are specific to the Community as 
a whole and to the 215 action in particular, features which render the conditions 




























































































Firstly, the Community is, in some respects, potentially a different type of deep- 
pocket insurer. The Community covers an area of twelve states and intervenes 
directly in the market through a variety of broad, open-textured provisions which 
aim to promote general economic goals if necessary at the expense of individual 
economic interests. Together with the Treaty of Rome’s acceptance of liability 
for normative acts, this would suggest that the Community may often be the 
object of large damages claims. Further, the Community has very limited 
financial resources, at least compared to its Member States, due mainly to the 
absence of power to levy direct taxes. The perils of being a deep-pocket 
insurer may be all the greater for the Community, and the need to restrict 
liability under Article 215 becomes all the more urgent.
As a correlative point, Article 215 actions tend, almost without exception, to 
deal with a particular type of case, where the Community institution has made 
a choice of economic policy. The Court frequently stresses the specific nature 
of these decisions and the need to give the institutions as free a hand as possible 
in making them.5'’ A general action against a Member State for breach of 
Community law will clearly encompass a wider range of decisions, requiring 
lesser degrees of flexibility on the part of the decision-making authorities, and 
accordingly, a more interventionist judicial approach.
Secondly, the restrictive Article 215 criteria are partially dictated by the complex 
and delicate nature of the Community legislative process. The frequent 
difficulty in achieving the requisite consensus to pass Community legislation, 
combined with the fact that Community acts can be declared invalid in 215 
proceedings has two basic consequences. The reality of the threat of liability 
in damages may seriously inhibit the discretion of the Community legislator, a 




























































































national interests, and the pressures of the Euro-lobby. Further, it may be 
extremely damaging to the general Community interest for the Court to overturn 
legislation which proved so difficult to arrive at in the first place. These 
concerns are also reflected in the Court’s strict interpretation of the requirements 
for standing to bring a direct challenge to a Community act under Article 
173.57
Thirdly, the policy behind the development of the Article 215 criteria is 
intimately tied up with the Court’s perception of the functioning of the 
Community remedies system as a whole. It seems that the criteria of Article 
215 have developed in part to ensure that applicants do not utilise the 215 action 
as merely an alternative means of having the legal effects of a particular act 
removed, thereby avoiding the rigourous standing criteria of the Article 173 
EEC action for annulment and the delays and other uncertainties inherent in the 
Article 177 EEC preliminary reference procedure. The standing criterion based 
on the seriousness of the loss suffered by the applicant, which has been evident 
in recent cases,5” clearly bears out this policy. It has the effect of establishing 
that the applicant genuinely requires a remedy in damages and is not ’abusing’ 
the Treaty’s schema of remedies.
This argument is supported by the views of Advocate General Tesauro in the 
Export Credit Insurance case. He felt that the criteria applicable to Article 215 
were designed to exclude those applicants who could have used the preliminary 
reference procedure with similar facility and effect.51'





























































































Nevertheless, the idea of applying Article 215 criteria to the Francovich action 
appealed to Advocate General Mischo. He argued that the Community could 
not reasonably oblige national courts to award damages against their public 
authorities on the basis of criteria broader than those applicable to Article 
215.6" Nevertheless, the 215 criteria were to be regarded as a minimum; 
national judges could hold the State liable on less restrictive conditions if 
national law permitted.61
The Advocate General seems concerned to ensure that the criteria which national 
courts will apply are no more favourable to the individual claimant than the 
criteria applicable to Community actions before the Court of Justice. This is 
very different from the Court’s view with respect to national remedies for breach 
of Community law, which, as noted above, requires that they be no less 
favourable to the claimant than remedies applicable to purely national law 
actions. The Court has been silent with respect to the question of whether 
national remedies ought to be more or less favourable than purely Community 
remedies, except to state in BALM that the comparison ought not to be made.62
The reasoning of the Advocate General’s must also be subjected to closer 
examination. He analogised with the issue of the availability of interim 
measures in actions against measures alleged to be in breach of Community law.
In recent years, the Court has handed down two landmark decisions in this 
field, Factortame I.63 dealing with national measures which may be contrary to 
Community law, and, subsequently, Zuckerfabrik.64 which concerned the 
power of national courts to suspend the operation of national provisions based 
on Community measures, owing to doubts about the validity of the Community 
measure. In the latter case, the Court, referring to its decision in Factortame 




























































































provisional protection’, national courts ought to apply the same rules with 
respect to interim relief which the Court itself applied in suspending the 
application of a Community provision under 185 EEC. This approach, of 
applying Community rules to national actions, the Advocate General felt, ought 
to be carried into the field of liability in damages.
It is no doubt reasonable to compare the situation in which the Court suspends 
a Community measure, and that in which a national court suspends a national 
provision based on a Community measure. The primary policy considerations 
underlying both instances of provisional protection, the need to protect 
individuals from serious and irreparable damage whilst at the same time 
maintaining, where possible, a presumption of legal validity and legal certainty, 
are the same.
In contrast, and in accordance with the above discussion, the policy 
considerations which have shaped the development of Article 215, particularly 
those which focus on the specific characteristics of the Community and the 
remedial system of the Treaty of Rome, cannot confidently be said to apply 
equally to the Francovich action. Francovich itself, furthermore, is founded 
upon a policy of promoting the effectiveness of Community law in general, and 
the implementation of directives in particular, which is not relevant to Article 
215 principles. The two remedies are qualitatively different and it would be 
unreasonable to treat them in the same way.
The application of Article 215 criteria was also said by the Advocate General 
to follow from the Asteris case,65 in which the Court held that its previous 
judgment dismissing a 215 action against the Community in respect of a 




























































































’precludes a national authority which merely implemented the Community 
legislative measure and was not responsible for its unlawfulness from 
being held liable on the same grounds.’66
Again, it is difficult to see how this argument can justify the transposition of 
Article 215 principles into the realm of national authority action. The key point 
in this type of case, as the Court suggests, is not whether national authority 
ought to be judged upon Article 215 criteria, or something broader, but rather 
that national authorities ought not to be judged at all because they are not 
responsible for the breach of Community law. Member States are subject to 
a strict duty, under Articles 5 and 189 EEC, to give effect to Community 
measures and it is the Community institution and it alone which can be held 
responsible for damage resulting from the promulgation of an illegal Community 
measure.67
In summary, whilst they have obvious attractions, particularly to defaulting 
Member States, the principles which govern the liability of Community 
institutions under Article 215 are not susceptible to transposition into the realm 
of the Francovich action.
Individual Enforcement: Francovich from the top down
In summary, it seems that the Francovich action has no direct analogue when 
it is viewed from the bottom up, that is, from the point of view of the 





























































































It is the main contention of this paper, however, that the Francovich action 
ought not to be conceptualised in this way. The remedy is better looked at 
from the top down, that is, from the point of view of the system of government 
which is Community law. This new Community law remedy, whilst conferring 
a potent weapon for enforcing their rights upon individuals, is primarily a means 
of enforcing, and enhancing the effectiveness of, Community law.68 The 
threat of liability in damages to individuals has great symbolic importance and 
will undoubtedly encourage a greater rigour in compliance amongst the Member 
States. The enhanced level of individual protection which the remedy may 
engender is arguably secondary to this goal.
When the damages remedy is conceived of in this way, it is apparent that the 
obvious basis for comparison in its future development is the Commission 169 
EEC enforcement action.61' This comparison is all the more pertinent given 
the new powers to be conferred upon the Court by the Treaty on European 
Union which will allow it to impose monetary penalties on non-compliant 
Member States.
The analogy is strengthened by certain cases brought under Article 169 which 
were cited by the Advocate General in Francovich in support of the general 
proposition that Member States can be liable to individuals. The Court has 
stated that an action under 169 protects an interest which:
’may, in particular, constitute the basis of liability to which a Member 
State may be subject by reason of its failure to fulfil an obligation, 





























































































This reasoning is significant. In predicting how the criteria for liability under 
Francovich could and should develop it is indeed necessary to draw upon the 
rich body of Court of Justice caselaw in relation to the 169 action. It is 
difficult to see any reason why the Court should attribute liability in principle 
to Member States for breach of Community law on the basis of criteria which 
differ according to whether the plaintiff happens to be the Commission or an 
individual. Given that the rationale behind the establishment of the remedy 
was, at least in part, to further alleviate the Commission’s enforcement burden 
it would be strange if the Member State were to be treated more favourably 
when sued by an individual ’attorney general’ than when brought to court by the 
Commission.
The specific principles which may be drawn out of the Article 169 caselaw will 
be set out in greater detail below. Nevertheless, it is important to note at this 
stage that the major characteristic of liability under Article 169 is that it is, for 
all intents and purposes, strict. It is very rare for a Member State in 169 
proceedings to succeed in justifying a failure to comply with Community law.
Various imaginative arguments have been put to the Court to excuse a prima 
facie breach of Community law; the vast majority have been rejected.71 The 
Court has tended to construe the duty to abide by Community law as a strict 
one, on the specific basis of 189 EEC in the area of implementing directives, 
and, inter alia, on the more general duty of cooperation of Article 5 EEC in 
other areas.
The primary reason for the Court’s strong line in 169 actions seems clearly to 
be the important Community interest in ensuring that Community law is 
observed. It is important to note, however, that the Court’s attitude has been 




























































































169, a mere declaration that the Member State has breached the law. The task 
of deciding whether to attribute liability is obviously made easier by the 
knowledge that the consequences for a state held to be in default are not serious.
The Conditions of Liability
The Article 169 comparison, whilst providing a general framework for analysis, 
may also assist in the elucidation of the specific conditions which should be 
applicable to the Francovich action.
A. Prior judgment under 169
There are several arguments against the proposition that a decision under Article 
169, or at least a prior ruling of some sort by the Court of Justice, is a pre­
requisite for Francovich liability. The Court itself was silent as to whether this 
was a decisive element of the Francovich circumstances. It is undisputed, 
however, that decisions under Article 169 actions are merely declaratory and not 
in themselves constitutive of breaches of Community law.72 Article 169 
actions, like preliminary references, are merely means to the end of establishing 
that a national decision contravenes Community law. This may be established 
equally by a national judge sitting in a domestic court, without the help of the 
European Court. Further, the Court of Justice has emphasised the principle of 
procedural economy in relation to actions under Article 215.73 It is difficult 
to see why this consideration should not apply equally to Francovich actions. 




























































































and may encourage delaying tactics by the Member States in question.
The use of the Article 169 analogy, however, is conclusive. When the 
Francovich remedy is looked upon as merely an alternative, individualised form 
of enforcement action, designed to relieve the burden on and compensate for the 
shortcomings of, Commission resources, it seems at best unnecessary and at 
worst incoherent, to require that the Member State be sued by both the official 
and the unofficial enforcement authorities.
B. The Requirement of Fault
The absence of a fault criterion from the Court’s reasoning in Francovich. is 
significant, inter alia because it conflicts with practice in a majority of Member 
States which do require fault by a public authority in order to sustain a damages 
action.74 The Court’s failure to mention fault may be explained on the basis 
that the criteria were written having regard to the particular context, the non­
implementation of a directive, and that following a ruling under Article 169 on 
the issue. In this instance, fault may be considered to be implicit in the failure 
to implement. Flowever, a more general explanation according to established 
169 caselaw is more appropriate. As has been noted above, in Article 169 
proceedings, the Court is very reluctant to accept arguments from Member 
States excusing their failure to observe Community law. Such arguments, 
which frequently focus on the issue of fault, have included claims that a lower 
level of government with a degree of autonomous power was responsible for the 
breach,77 that another, constitutionally independent branch of government was 





























































































The closest which the Court of Justice has come to making provision for fault 
has been the recognition of the principle of force maieure. In the Statistical 
Returns case,78 wherein Italy’s obligatory statistical returns to the Community 
were destroyed in a bomb attack, the Court conceded that the Member State 
which has encountered insurmountable difficulties outside its control could not 
be held responsible for the consequent breach of Community law.
It is difficult, however, to see any justification for the Court of Justice being 
prepared to accept broader fault-based excuses from a Member State in the 
context of a Francovich damages claim which it would not have accepted in 169 
proceedings, particularly where the result in the former instance may well be a 
denial of substantive justice to an individual.
There are also certain conceptual problems relating to the judicial structure of 
the Community system which arise in the context of a requirement of fault. 
The Court of Justice encourages national courts to make Article 177 references 
unless the answer is clear to them and they are certain that other national courts 
would come to the same conclusion.79 In cases of doubt, and in more clear 
cut but politically sensitive cases, the tendency of the national courts would be 
to refer as much as possible to the Court of Justice. It is difficult then to argue 
that national authorities were at fault, in acting knowingly or even negligently 
in breach of Community law, if a reference to the Court of Justice was required 
to determine that the breach had in fact occurred.
C. The Definition of the State




























































































arising out of a breach of Community Law for which it was responsible. The 
issue of responsibility raises the question as to which agencies are to be 
considered to be part of the state apparatus.8"
This task of drawing the line between the public and the private spheres arises 
in several other areas of Community law. Marshall, for example, requires the 
distinction to be drawn in order to distinguish vertical from horizontal direct 
effect, since an individual can only claim a directly effective right against an 
organ of the state.81 A similar project is required, inter alia, to determine the 
scope of the public authority exception to the free movement of workers under 
Article 48 EEC.82
In each example, the way in which the public-private distinction is to be drawn 
depends on underlying policy considerations.83 In the Marshall scenario, the 
Court is determined to construe the state as broadly as possible so as to give as 
many individuals as possible access to the remedial potential of direct effect.84
On the other hand, the Court’s policy in relation to the public authority 
exception has been to draw a narrow picture of the state in order to open up as 
many jobs as possible to the principles governing the free movement of workers.
In relation to Francovich. it is arguable that the Court will strive for a broad 
definition of the State so as to bring as many breaches of Community law as 
possible within the ambit of the remedy. Nevertheless, the paradigm ought not 
to be the Foster definition but rather the Court’s practice in relation to Article 
169. An important case in this respect is the ’Buy Irish’ case.85 The 
attribution of liability to the Irish Government for the activities of ’The Irish 
Goods Council’ in this case suggests that state responsibility may arise through 






























































































Other details may be predicted on the basis of 169 practice; for example, the 
fact that interim protection is available in 169 proceedings would suggest that 
it should also be available in the Francovich action.87
Certain criteria, however, cannot be gleaned from the Article 169 caselaw 
because of the nature of that remedy. For example, the conditions applicable 
in the instance of non-implementation of a directive, include the existence of a 
causal link of unspecified proximity between the failure to implement and the 
damage to the individual. Article 169 has not thus far proceeded beyond the 
identification of the breach of Community law and so can be of little help in 
elaborating this concept.
The natural place to look for assistance would be the principles applicable to 
Article 215, which, after all, are derived from those of the Member States. In 
Dumortier. the Court determined that the damage to the individual had to be ’a 
sufficiently direct result’ of the actions of the defendant institution in order to 
found liability under Article 215.88 However, in accordance with the Court’s 
general policies in relation to Article 215, virtually any interposing causal factor 
has been enough to render the link insufficiently direct, although in exceptional 
cases the Court has been willing to countenance the apportioning of blame.89 
A different, more lenient, approach may be anticipated in relation to the 




























































































Limiting Damages: Article 169 and the Floodgates of Liability
Whilst the argument that Francovich ought to develop by analogy with Article 
169 actions has a certain theoretical basis, it must be recognised that the 
damages remedy is significantly different from the 169 declaration, threatening 
altogether more serious consequences for the defaulting Member State. The 
argument that an assessment of liability under Francovich should proceed on the 
same basis as under Article 169 must address the threat of indeterminate public 
authority liability. If every prima facie breach of Community law by a Member 
State which occasioned harm to an individual were to lead directly to a finding 
of liability in damages, the amount of damages paid out would be astronomical, 
with serious consequences for the ability of governments to intervene in the 
running of society.
It must be said, at the outset, that the threat of overwhelming damages claims 
against Member States seemed to be secondary in the mind of the Court in 
Francovich to its concern to promote the effectiveness of Community law. This 
may be inferred firstly from the fact that, contrary to the advice of its Advocate 
General, the Court declined to limit the temporal effect of its judgment. The 
damages remedy is therefore applicable to factual situations arising before 
November 1991. Secondly, the criteria which the Court laid down in respect 
of the immediate issue, the failure of a State to transpose a directive, are 
broad,911 utilising, on their face, none of the mechanisms traditionally used in 
national systems to limit public liability.1'1
Further, it is argued that the analogy with Article 169 is not defeated by the 




























































































Justice in other fields, there are a number of ways in which the potential liability 
in damages of Member States can be maintained within limits which suggest to 
them a real incentive to give effect to Community law without, however, 
presaging their financial ruin.
A. Restricting the Use of the Remedy
The first and arguably the bluntest way in which liability in damages may be 
restricted is by reducing, ab initio, the class of potential plaintiffs who are 
entitled to claim damages under Francovich. There are two ways of doing this.
Firstly, the remedy may be treated as one of last resort only. The Court of 
Justice has already gone some way towards ordering the various remedies 
available to individuals into a hierarchy of preference. Direct effect is only to 
be cited where Community law cannot be given effect by means of the 
interpretation of national law in accordance with it, as required by von Colson 
and Marleasing.)2 This seems only logical. Direct effect, and damages 
claims, for that matter, involve the citation of provisions of Community law in 
opposition to national law. The issue of whether national law can be read as 
being compatible with Community law is clearly a preliminary one.
In the absence of the possibility of giving a Marleasing interpretation to national 
law, the methodology of the Francovich judgment is to examine firstly whether 
the instrument in question is susceptible to direct effect, and only if it is not to 
contemplate providing the individual with a remedy in damages. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the Francovich remedy is intended to be a safety- 
net, only to be used where the primary recourses, the interpretation of national 




























































































right are not available. Such an approach would considerably reduce the 
number of damages claims.
Secondly, the Court may restrict the use of the remedy, and therefore the 
seriousness of its consequences temporally, on a case by case basis. Such an 
approach would be consistent with its strategy in other areas, notably in relation 
to Article 119, whereby the Court has upheld broad principles of equality, but 
mitigated the wide-ranging consequences of its judgments by denying them, with 
varying degrees of success, a retroactive effect.'1 This practice seems partly 
to be based upon the view that the plaintiff, having invested time and money in 
bringing the case, which has itself served a valuable purpose in the context of 
the Community legal order, deserves to reap the benefits in the individual case.
Other potential plaintiffs, except those who have already commenced actions, 
and themselves made a certain investment in the Community interest, are 
excluded, as volunteers. Also, once the point of Community law has been 
clarified in a single case, the benefit for the Community legal order of future 
cases on the same issue is reduced.
The fact that there is no time limit put on Francovich itself, does not imply that 
none should be put on future damages claims. The facts of Francovich may be 
seen as special in this respect. Individuals were claiming damages in lieu of 
arrears of salary which ought to have been provided to them by a body 
designated by the Italian Government. The link between the right to arrears 
conferred by Community law and the action for damages was thus a direct one, 
and the default by Italy rather blatant.1"1 It would arguably have been 
unreasonable to exclude other individuals in the same position as the applicants 
from bringing actions in the future. These individuals were, and are, clearly 




























































































alternative means of obtaining it.
Thirdly, at least in the case of non-transposition of directives, the range of 
potential plaintiffs may be restricted by means of a strict construction of the 
requirement that a directive must confer rights for the benefit of individuals. 
The use of the remedy may be limited to the specific class of people to whom 
the directive, or the particular provision(s) of the directive in question, is 
intended to benefit. English courts have adopted this approach with respect to 
the tort of breach of statutory duty. For liability to ensue, the plaintiff must, 
as a preliminary point, belong to a class which the duty in question is 
specifically intended to benefit. In this way, claims relating to general duties, 
and those made by individuals outwith the beneficiary class, will fail.g5 On 
this view, regardless of the national rules on locus standi, a claim in damages 
against the Italian Government for failure to transpose Directive 80/987 would 
not be available to, for example, dependents and creditors of sacked workers, 
trade unions and other interested parties who may be able to show damage.
B. Reasonable Breaches of Community Law
The fact that a successful 169 action results in a mere declaration against the 
Member State, that it was in breach of Community law, dictates that liability can 
be attributed without undue rigour in situations where there were varying 
degrees of pre-existing uncertainty about the state of the law. The Court in this 
way acts in an advisory capacity, giving a definitive interpretation of the law in 
cases of doubt. Where the result of an action may be the award of possibly 





























































































it seems tempting, in this regard, to borrow criteria of liability from Article 215 
jurisprudence, which, as noted above, would award damages only in the case of 
serious breaches of Community law. ’Marginal’ or ’reasonable’ breaches thus 
escape financial sanction. This temptation should, however, be resisted.
In the immediate case of implementation of directives, the question of whether 
a directive has been correctly implemented seems clearly to be an objective one. 
It cannot be dependent on the subjective attitude or intention of the Member 
State in question.96 This is reflected in the Court’s decisions under Article 
169. National measures which reasonably but incorrectly implement a 
Community directive, are, nevertheless, in breach of Community law. and if the 
directive gives clearly identifiable rights to private parties, and incorrect 
implementation gives rise to damage to an individual, then, under Francovich, 
damages may be awarded.
If, as suggested above, Francovich liability is to extend beyond the specific facts 
of the case, to other types of breach of Community law, it is hard to see any 
justification for considering the seriousness of the breach in these other areas, 
where it is not relevant to the implementation of directives.
It may seem harsh to contemplate awarding potentially large amounts of 
damages where the Member State has acted reasonably. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted initially that breaches of Community law, in particular in the case of 
failure to properly transpose directives, do not arise suddenly or without portent. 
The legislative process in any Member State covers a substantial period of time 
and offers ample opportunity for the State to consult with, inter alia, the 
Commission, in cases of doubt, so reducing the likelihood of unforeseen 




























































































Further, the obligation of national judges to interpret national law in accordance 
with Community law may render the marginal breach of Community law, 
particularly in the context of the implementation of directives, if not obsolete 
then at least rare.
The argument has been made over the years that the 169 remedy is is too weak 
and can have little real effect in encouraging compliance with Community law.
Now that a stronger remedy against failure by Member States to apply 
Community law has been created, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the 
Court ought to soften its approach towards attributing liability for breach of 
Community law. The end result of the approach outlined above is that Member 
States will have to be extremely vigilant in ensuring that they have complied 
with Community law. Such vigilance can only strengthen the Community legal 
order.
Conclusion
The Francovich judgment has laid down a principle of potentially major 
constitutional significance for the Community. The way in which that principle 
is elaborated in the future will determine the extent of this significance. The 
Article 169 enforcement action is the remedy which approximates closest to 
Francovich. and the one which ought to act as the paradigm for the latter’s 
development. In this way, Francovich should be conceived primarily as an 
individual enforcement action, rather than as a means by which an individual 




























































































Having taken the necessary and arguably inevitable step of recognising a remedy 
in damages, it is to be hoped that the Court of Justice will not apply to 
Francovich restrictive conditions of liability such as those which it has laid 
down in the context of Article 215. The Francovich remedy could do much for 
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for Illegal Directives: Effective Judicial Protection?’ (1992) 17 ELR 46, noting 
Export Credit Insurance, supra n 44. See also Joined Cases 106-120/87 Asteris 




























































































52 . Joined Cases 19 & 126/79 BALM [1980] ECR 1863, 1879. The Court also 
dismissed the relevance of Article 215 to actions of Member States, although on 
procedural grounds, in Case 101/78 Granaria BV v Hoofdproduktschap voor 
Akkerbouwprodukten [1979] ECR 623. Further, the Court stated in Case 60/75 
Russo v AIM A [1976] ECR 45, that liability of a Member State for breach of 
Community law must be established by the national courts ’in the context of the 
provisions of national law relating to the liability of the State.’
53. Case 199/82 San Giorgio, supra n 33.
54. The policy issues relating to Article 215 are discussed by T.Roberts, 
’Judicial Review of Legislative Measures: the European Court Breathes Life 
into the Second Paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome’ (1988) 26 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 247, 255-262.
55. The classic statement of principle on this issue was made in the United 
States Supreme Court, by Cardozo, J in Ultramares Corporation v Touche 174 
NE 441, 444 (1931). He warned of the dangers of liability ’in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.’ In the English 
courts, see, for example, the ruling of the Privy Council in Rowling v Takaro 
Properties Ltd, supra n 40.
56. The Schoppenstedt formula, quoted supra p***, specifically relates to 
’legislative action involving choices of economic policy’. This wording has 
been repeated in subsequent pronouncements.
57. See generally, Hartley, supra n 16, chapter 13 and Steiner, supra n 41, 
chapter 27.
58. See Sovrimport and Mulder, supra n 46.
59. The Court has indicated a concern to preserve the relationship between the 
various remedies suggested by the Treaty in other areas. Its policy in relation 
to Article 173, which has been to construe the locus standi requirements of 
direct and individual concern strictly has the effect of giving a literal 
interpretation to the wording of the Treaty. Only addressees and de facto 
addressees of Community measures may challenge them directly. See, for 
example. Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95; Case 
789/79 Calpak SpA v Commission [1980] ECR 1949. Parties to whom 
measures are merely applied are encouraged to challenge them by means of the 
177 preliminary reference procedure which, the Court clearly believes was 





























































































60. Paragraph 71 of his opinion.
61. Paragraph 72.
62. supra n 52. The idea that there might be a double standard in operation in 
the Community, with Member State actions subjected to more stringent 
conditions than those applicable to the Community institutions is not a new one; 
such a double standard has been clearly identified, inter alia, in the field of the 
application of the general principles of Community law. See generally Steiner, 
supra n 41, chapter 4 and J.Coppel and A.O’Neill, The European Court of 
Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, (1992) 29 CMLRev 669.
63. Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and 
others [1990] ECR 1-2433.
64. supra n 36.
65. Joined Cases 106-120/87 Asteris AE and others v Greece, supra n 51.
66. at paragraph 18.
67. See further n 51, supra. See also Advocate General Capotorti in Granaria. 
supra n 52, at 644.
68. See Snyder, supra n 13.
69. On the 169 action, see A.Dashwood and R.White, supra n 20. See also 
U.Everling, ’The Member States of the European Communities before their 
Court of Justice’ (1984) 9 ELRev 215.
70. See most recently Case C-249/88 Commission v Belgium 19.3.1991 at 
paragraph 41. Other cases are noted to illustrate that Member States are liable 
no matter which organ of the State is responsible for the failure, Case 52/75 
Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 277, and that Member States must take all 
necessary measures to remedy their defaults, Joined Cases 24 and 97/80 
Commission v France [1980] ECR 1319.
71. Various examples of the Court’s attitude may be given: Joined Cases 6 and 
11/69 Commission v France (aid to coal and steel exports! [1969] ECR 523; 
Case 16/69 Commission v Belgium (tax on imported woodl [1970] ECR 237; 
Case 48/71 Commission v Italy (art treasures! [1972] ECR 527; Case 30/72 
Commission v Italy (fruit tree grubbingl [1973] ECR 161; Case 128/78 
Commission v UK (tachographs! [1979] ECR 419; Case 306/84 Commission 




























































































Commission v Italy (wild birds') [1991] ECR 1-57; Commission v Italy (toxic 
waste in Campania), supra n 18.
72. See, for example, Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 1125 and 
Joined Cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Procureur de la République and Comité 
National de Défense contre l’Alcoolisme v Waterkevn [1982] ECR 4337.
73. Case 43/72 Merkur v Commission [1973] ECR 1055. The applicant was 
allowed to claim damages on the basis of a Community act which had not 
previously been held to be invalid in Article 173 proceedings. The illegality 
or otherwise of the act could equally well be established in the context of the 
damages proceedings.
74. It should be noted, however, that in certain states, notably Belgium and 
France, there is little meaningful distinction drawn between an unlawful act and 
a fault.
75. Re Suckler Cows. Toxic Waste in Campania, supra n 18.
76. Commission v Belgium (tax on imported wood), supra n 71.
77. Joined Cases 90 and 91/63 Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium [1964] 
ECR 625.
78. Case 101/84 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 2629.
79. See CILFIT. supra n 34.
80. This point was raised in the English courts in Kirklees BC v Wickes. supra 
n 35. The House of Lords conceded that if the Court of Justice found the 
Sunday trading provisions of the Shops Act to be contrary to Article 30 then 
’the UK Government may be obliged to make good damage caused to 
individuals by the breach of Art 30 for which it is responsible’ (per Lord Goff 
at 786). However, the Council was not required to give an undertaking to the 
respondent that it would make good the damages in these circumstances, inter 
alia because such a declaration would impose liability on the Council whereas 
in fact, according to Francovich. it should properly lie with the Government.
81. See Marshall, supra n 22; Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR 
1-3313; Doughty v Rolls Rovce [1992] CMLR 1045; D.Curtin, The Province 
of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law 




























































































82. Artide 48(4) states that: ’The provisions of this Article shall not apply to 
employment in the public service. See, for example, Case 149/79 Commission 
v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, [1982] ECR 1845; Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v 
Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121; Case 33/88 Allue & Coonan v 
Università degli studi di Venezia [1989] ECR 1591; J.Handoll, ’Artide 48(4) 
EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment’ (1988) 13 ELR 223; 
G.Morris, S.Fredman and J.Hayes, ’Free Movement and the Public Sector’ 
(1990) 19 ILJ 20. The public-private distinction also arises in other areas of 
Community, such as the regime for state aids of Article 92 EEC.
83. See the comments of Advocate General Van Gerven in Foster, supra n 81, 
at p3336.
84. The Court in Foster, supra n 81, laid down a broad definition of the state. 
It stated, at paragraph 20, that:
’[A] body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service 
under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers 
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations 
between individuals is included in any event among the bodies against 
which the provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be 
relied upon.’
This is to be read together with the with the advice of Advocate General Van 
Gerven, at p3341, that the definition was to be applied with a view to a broad 
construction of the state.
85. Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005.
86. In this example, the Irish Government had appointed the chairman and 
members of ’The Irish Goods Council’ provided most of its funds and laid down 
the aims and outline of the promotional campaign.
87. See, for example, Case C-246/89R Commission v United Kingdom [1989] 
ECR 3125.
88. Joined Cases 64 and 113/76, supra n 44, at para 21.
89. See, for example, Joined Cases 145/83 & 53/84 Adams v Commission 
[1985] ECR 3539.




























































































91. Temple Lang, supra n 1 at p23 points out that, in view of the opinion of 
Advocate General Tesauro in Factortame (No.l). the Court was quite aware that 
Community Law might give a right to compensation (and a large amount of 
compensation at that) in the circumstances of the Factortame case. It did 
nothing, however, to limit the Francovich principle in order that it might not 
apply to the facts of Factortame.
92. Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases C-177/88 and C-179/88 Dekker 
v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen ("VJV-Centruml [1990] 
ECR 1-3941, 3956 and Handels- og Kintorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark 
v Dansk Arbeidsgiverforening (Hertz) favouring this view, described the Court’s 
case-law on the direct effect of directives as ’no more than a last resort’(at 
p3958). For the alternative view, that plaintiffs should have a free choice of 
remedy, see Ross, supra n 1, at p59.
93. See Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena World Airlines [1976] ECR 455 and 
Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance [1990] ECR I- 
1889. The determination of the precise meaning of non-retroactivity in Barber 
remains to be determined. See also Case 24/86 Blaizot v University of Liège 
[1988] ECR 379.
94. The Court may be seen to be adopting the Advocate General’s view as to 
the seriousness of the case against Italy. He stated, at paragraph 1 of his 
opinion, that:
’Rarely has the court had to give judgment in a case where the loss 
caused to individuals concerned by a failure to implement a Directive has 
been as scandalous as here.’
95. Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium [1949] AC 398 and Curran v Northern Ireland 
Coownership Housing Association Ltd [1987] AC 718 are good examples of this 
approach.
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